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Background
The peer review system is a cornerstone of scientific research enterprise. The devel-
opment of science in the last century is an partial endorsement of the value of peer 
review (Alberts et al. 2008). Unfortunately, peer review systems have recently been under 
severe strain potentially contributing to cases of misconduct and fraud, such as the stem 
cell scandal in Science (Crocker and Cooper 2011) or the more recent open-access jour-
nals investigation by Plunk (2013). Some of the potential drawbacks result from the fact 
that the peer review system is a complex social interaction where scientists interact in 
various roles as journal editors, authors and reviewers in a decentralised, scarcely trans-
parent and relatively unregulated system. Thus, the different behaviours (e.g., positive 
and negative) of scientists may result in unpredictable collective outcomes in terms of 
quality and fairness of the reviewing process (Martins 2013). Meanwhile, peer review 
is a cooperation dilemma that lacks transparency and reputational incentives/sanctions. 
This creates conditions for self-interest behaviours (Xiao et al. 2014).
The main challenge is how to measure the influence of these various social interactions 
on peer review and then modify the existing systems in order to minimize the negative 
and bad effects. Generally, most scientists and journal editors have opinions on how to 
improve this system, nevertheless it is ambiguous to distinguish which method would 
be most effective without performing large scale experiments. A large body of research 
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have been done on analyzing the validity and reliability of peer review (Benos et al. 2007; 
Hojat et al. 2003). The pitfalls, bias, and ethics of peer review had been discussed (Lee 
et al. 2013; Souder 2011). Meanwhile, to study and optimize peer review, many empiri-
cal analysis and statistical approaches have been proposed (Bornmann 2011; Gallo et al. 
2014; Petchey et al. 2014). Additionally, examining the quality of various social interac-
tions through empirical analysis from a system level is a tedious and context-dependent 
task (Edmonds et al. 2011). Some researchers begin to simulate the social process of peer 
review from a modeling perspective (Squazzoni and Takács 2011), so that approximate 
measures of the phenomenon can be manipulated.
Recent articles, such as Paolucci and Grimaldo (2014), demonstrated that peer review 
should be viewed as a complex social interaction problem which requires simulations 
of social systems to investigate it. Social simulations can help to explore the relevance 
of social interactions and scientists’ behaviours to better understand how peer review 
systems work. More importantly, social simulations, especially the agent-based model in 
this paper, can be used to test various scenarios under specific circumstances. A typical 
example of applying agent-based modeling to simulate science was Gilbert’s model (Gil-
bert 1997) which succeeds in designing a specialty structure with ‘areas’ of science dis-
playing growth and decline.
An influential simulation of the social factors of peer review was reported by Thurner 
and Hanel (2011), where the authors studied the effect of rational reviewers, who might 
not want to see high quality work better than their own published or promoted, with an 
agent-based model. They found out that a small fraction of incorrect reviewers is suf-
ficient to drastically lower the quality of the accepted publications. They showed how a 
simple quality-increasing policy can lead to additional loss in overall scientific quality. 
The same model was applied in Roebber and Schultz (2011), where the authors focused 
on funding requests instead of peer review of papers.
In Squazzoni and Gandelli (2012), the authors investigated whether the quality and 
efficiency of peer review is more influenced by scientists’ behaviour or by the type of 
scientific community structure (homogeneous vs. heterogeneous). They modeled peer 
review as a process based on knowledge asymmetries and subject to evaluation bias. 
They also analyzed the reciprocity behaviour in peer review and found out that reciproc-
ity can have a positive effect on peer review only when reviewers are not driven by self-
interest motivation and are inspired by standards of fairness. Based on this work, they 
further studied the mechanisms of peer review in Squazzoni and Gandelli (2013).
Previous modeling approaches on peer review were mostly designed from author–
reviewer (Cabotà et al. 2014) or author–reviewer–conference perspective (Allesina 2012), 
where they simply overlook the impact of editors’ behaviours. However, there is no doubt 
that editors play an important role during the whole review process. It is known to all 
that editors are the bridges between authors and reviewers and so play a gate-keeping 
role. At the very beginning editors decide how to build the reviewer community and how 
to assign submitted papers to specific reviewers. After reviewing, the final decisions are 
also made by editors based on reviewers’ comments. Surprisingly, despite its significance, 
relatively few attempts have been made to analyze editors’ behaviours on peer review.
Few models introduced above consider the effect of editorial behaviours  (Cabotà 
et  al. 2014; Day 2015). In relation to editors, a limited number of studies have 
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evaluated publication performance in editorial decision making based on statistical 
analysis  (Maner 2014; van Lent et  al. 2014). The work in  Schultz (2010) showed how 
number of reviewers and different decision-making strategies affect the rejection rate 
of manuscripts. However, their results were achieved from analyzing data involving 500 
manuscripts submitted to Monthly Weather Review without a detailed model. In order 
to achieve a better understanding of how editors affect peer review system/process, we 
employ an agent-based model to test/evaluate various editorial behaviors.
Methods
To explore the influence of editors in peer review, we implement a simulation framework 
inspired by Thurner and Hanel (2011) in which various editors’ strategies can be tested. 
Our model is based on a population of agents playing three roles, i.e., editors, reviewers 
and authors. The author writes and submits paper to editors of a conference/journal. 
Then the editors allocate submissions to a set number of reviewers chosen from similar-
interest authors. The reviewers will evaluate the submission and give a binary decision 
(‘accept’ or ‘reject’) to editors. Finally, the editors will decide to accept/reject this sub-
mission according to reviewers comments and the requirements of the conference/jour-
nal. The whole process of peer review can be seen from Fig. 1.
In terms of editors’ behaviors, we specifically consider: (1) Biased versus unbiased 
behavior: Biased behavior means that an editor will help to accept papers submitted by 
his friends (or members of same group such as co-authors) regardless of quality. Previ-
ous studies mostly focus on how to measure the effects of reviewers bias such as the 
rational behaviour on peer review, where editor’s bias and honesty are overlooked. (2) 
Number of Reviewers: Our aim was to test the impact of the number of reviewers on 
rejection rate and quality of published papers. With more comments from more review-
ers, editors can easily evaluate and make a decision regarding a submitted paper. How-
ever, the cost of reviewing one paper also rises at the same time. Therefore, we want to 
measure the effect of different number of reviewers in our proposed model. (3) Deci-


























Fig. 1 Depiction of the flow of peer review system. Authors write and submit papers to editors. Editors will 
behave biased if the he has a close relationship with the author. Then editors distribute papers to specific 
reviewers. Three editorial decision-making strategies are explored: P-all, P-any and P-Majority. Finally, editors 
will decide whether the submission should be published or not
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based on ‘accept’ suggestion from all reviewers (P-all), Publish a paper based on ‘accept’ 
suggestion from any reviewer (P-any), and Publishing a paper based on ‘accept’ recom-
mendation from majority of reviewers (P-majority). It also explores interactions effects 
between these strategies with different behaviors of reviewers. A set of rules govern the 
behaviors of these agents to simulate the peer review process (e.g., rational behaviors of 
reviewers).
Peer review entities
Our proposed model simulates peer review as a quality selection process where authors, 
reviewers and editors interact with each other. The authors write papers, submit them to 
editors for review. Our definition for the scientific quality of authors follows a Gaussian 
distribution. This means that the scientific quality of authors follows normal distribution 
at the very beginning, i.e. each author i is assigned a Qauthori ∈ N (Qinitial , σ 2author), where 
σauthor is the standard deviation of scientific quality of authors and Qinitial is the initial 
average quality of all authors. We consider that in relation to papers published, the scien-
tific quality of authors may increase based on previous published papers by γ.
The paper entity is the basic unit of evaluation. The quality of submissions follows a 
normal distribution centred around author quality Qauthor. The quality of a paper sub-
mitted by author i is Qpaperi ∈ N (Qauthori , σ 2paper), where σpaper is the standard deviation 
of a paper’s quality. The practical meaning of the above analysis is that, with some prob-
abilities good scientists could write average or low-quality papers, and average scientists 
had some chances to write high-quality papers (Squazzoni and Gandelli 2012).
Each submitted paper is sent to specific independent reviewers, randomly chosen by 
the editors. Each reviewer belongs to one of the following categories, i.e., the correct, 
the harried, and the selfish. The correct reviewers will fairly accept high-quality papers 
and reject low-quality papers. They will recommend publication only for high-quality 
papers, defined as those which exceed a minimum threshold Qave. This threshold can be 
calculated in various ways. In this paper, we adopt a simple moving average to compute 
the threshold shown in Eq. (1) below:
where Qaccpt(t − 1) indicates the average of all accepted papers in last round. In other 
words reviewers will accept papers with quality higher than this threshold. The har-
ried reviewers behave like the correct reviewer, but they cannot assess paper qual-
ity correctly. They may overrate or underrate a submission. To be specific, their 
evaluation scores take a standard deviation around the real quality of the paper, i.e. if 
N (Qsubmitj , σ
2
harried) ≥ Qave, where σharried is the harried standard deviation, the harried 
reviewers will make positive comments. The selfish reviewers are not willing to accept 
papers better than their own because they know that any scientific research work bet-
ter than their may weaken their academic reputation (Thurner and Hanel 2011). At the 
same time they will not accept very low-quality papers. That is, a selfish reviewer i will 
recommend declining a proposal that is either superior to his/her own work or below a 
minimum quality, i.e. Qsubmitj ∈ [Qmin,Qauthori ]. From an individual point of view the self-
ish editor may be a rational one.
(1)Qave(t) = Qave(t − 1)+ (1− )Qaccpt(t − 1)
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The editor, who matches authors and reviewers, might be an importance source of bias 
and influence in the peer review system. In order to simplify the discussion in this paper 
we assume that every submission is submitted to one editor. There may be situations 
in which the editor and authors share common friendship networks, where members 
belong the same group, such as a co-authorship network (Thurner and Hanel 2011). In 
the case of analyzing the editorial biased behavior regarding acceptance and quality of 
peer review, we assume the editor will be biased or fair with probability of eb and 1− eb 
respectively, where eb indicates that the editor share common friendship networks with 
eb fractions of authors. The fair editor will allocate submissions to reviewers randomly. 
The biased editor will treat submissions differently. In such cases, a biased editor will 
allocate submissions to reviewers within their friendship networks. Consequently, due to 
editor bias, such reviewers will accept papers more easily. More specifically, the reviewer 
will reduce the reviewing standard. For example, in the case of an reviewer who is con-
nected with the editor, if Qsubmitj ≥ ξ × Qave, where ξ ∈ [0, 1], the paper will be accepted. 
Otherwise, a biased editor will behave similarly to a fair one.
Peer review process
A population of N  =  100 productive scientists was used for this simulation, each of 
which follows one of two roles: author or reviewer. When selected as authors, scientists 
will write and submit manuscripts while selected reviewers will give comments on sub-
mitted manuscripts. The whole peer review process is shown in Fig.  1. Each scientist 
produces one paper at every time step. The quality of a submitted paper is described 
above. At every time step, each submitted paper is sent to K independent reviewers, 
randomly chosen from the N scientists by the editor. Authors cannot review their own 
paper. Each reviewer will give a binary recommendation within the same time step: 
‘accept’ or ‘reject’ based on which kind of reviewer he/she is. The fractions of three kinds 
of reviewer are fc, fr and fh respectively, with fc + fr + fh = 1. Based on these recom-
mendations, the editor will decide whether the submission should be published or not. 
We explore three decision-making strategies for editors in this paper: P-all, P-any and 
P-majority.
All simulation parameters are shown in Table  1. The average quality of researchers 
is set at the beginning of the simulation at 100. At the first round, half of papers are 
published. Subsequently, papers will get published following previous rules. After each 
round, the quality of author will raise by γ so that their qualities grow accordingly. This 
means that scholars will learn from previous work and write higher quality papers next 
time. Meanwhile, the average quality of submitted papers will rise according, i.e, from 
100 to 125 after 300 rounds.
We designed various simulation scenarios to test the impact of editors’ behaviours on 
the quality of peer review. We examined how editorial behaviours influence the average 
quality of all accepted papers. By the average quality of published papers we can verify 
Table 1 Simulation parameters
Parameter N T Qinitial γ σauthor σpaper σharried K ξ
Value 1000 500 100 0.05 10 5 5 [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] 0.9
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the performance of quality selection of the peer review process. Another metric we 
measure is the number of all published papers, from which we can verify the acceptance 
rate of a journal/conference. Furthermore, we show the number of low-quality papers 
published (i.e., with an intrinsic value less than the average), as an indicator of occasional 
failures (Lee et al. 2013). While two previous quantities can be seen as measures of qual-
ity and efficiency, this one can be considered as a measure of fairness.
Results
We first examine the effect of rational reviewers in comparison with previous work 
(Thurner and Hanel 2011). The quality of average accepted papers with different frac-
tions of rational reviewers is shown in Fig. 2 (with all editors being fair). With fractions 
of over 70 % of rational reviewers the selection mechanism in the reviewing process is 
almost the same with random selection. Figure 2 further illustrates the situation for two 
fixed fractions of harried reviewers fh = 0.1 and 0.2. Obviously, the harried reviewers 
will slightly bring down the accepted paper quality.
Figures  3a, 4a and 5a depict the average quality of accepted papers. These figures 
clearly show that differences in editorial strategies matter. Taking K = 3 for example, if 
the editorial decision strategy is P-any, the final average publication quality is 125.882, 
while the final average publication qualities are 129.348 and 135.455 when the editorial 
decision strategies are P-majority and P-all, respectively.
In Figs.  3b, 4b and 5b, where we show the number of accepted papers, indicate 
that with when the average publication quality increases, the number of publication 
Fig. 2 The effect of different fractions of rational reviewers on the average quality of accepted papers. With 
more fractions of rational reviewers, the quality of publications will drop sharply. Further more, the harried 
reviewers will slightly bring down the quality of publications
a b c
Fig. 3 The performance of P-any in terms of average quality of publications (a), number of published papers 
(b) and number of low-quality papers published (c). The number of reviewers is from 1 to 5
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decreases accordingly. The reason is that given the number of reviewers is stable, when 
editors are looking for more positive reviews, some submissions of relatively low qual-
ity will be eventually rejected. Thus the number of accepted papers decreases, while the 
average quality increases.
To measure the fairness of different strategies, we examine the number of low-qual-
ity papers published shown in Figs. 3c, 4c and 5c. Considering K = 3 for example, the 
number of low-quality papers published are 405, 146 and 21 when the strategies are 
P-any, P-majority and P-all, respectively. We can see that if reviewers seek for strict 
quality selection by P-all or P-majority, the number of low-quality papers published 
will decrease. In other words, the reviewing process will be more fair. However, if the 
a b c
Fig. 4 The performance of P-majority in terms of average quality of publications (a), number of published 




Fig. 5 The performance of P-all in terms of average quality of publications (a), number of published papers 
(b) and number of low-quality papers published (c). The number of reviewers is from 1 to 5
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decision strategy chosen by an editor is too rigorous, the number of accepted papers 
may be too small, which may lead to a low acceptance rate.
The above analysis shows that different decision strategies adopted by editors will dra-
matically affect the performance of peer review in terms of average quality of published 
papers, number of published papers and low-quality papers published. The results sug-
gest that P-all and P-majority perform better than P-any in terms of quality and fairness.
Figure  3 also depicts the performance of different numbers of reviewer K on peer 
review, where the decision strategy is P-majority. We can see from Fig.  3a that as K 
increases, the average quality of publications upsurges slightly. Meanwhile, both the 
numbers of published papers and the low-quality papers published decline in accord-
ance. The results indicate that with a higher number of reviewers, the quality and fair-
ness of peer review will be better and more effective. Figures 4 and 5 also show similar 
trends of various K in terms of quality, number of publication and low-quality papers 
published.
Finally, in Fig. 6, we show the results from a simulation of editorial biased behaviour. 
We set K = 3 and the initial decision strategy is P-majority. The simulations have been 
set into two scenarios that we call bias with rational reviewers (BR) and bias without 
rational reviewers (BW). These scenarios can help us to better understand the editorial 
biased behaviour with and without rational reviewers.
Figure 6a shows the average quality of publication with the increasing of eb. In both the 
BR condition (the black line) and BW condition (the red line), the average quality drops 
accordingly with more fractions of biased editors. It can be seen from Fig. 6a that a small 
fraction of biased editors (10 %) brings the quality down. To be more specific, from 130.5 
to 118.4 (BW) and from 122.9 to 117.6 (BR). The average quality of publications is even 
a b
c d
Fig. 6 The outcomes of editorial biased behavior, using K = 3 and P-majority. a, b Depict the average quality 
of publication and number of published papers under BR (red line) and BW (black line) respectively. The num-
ber of low-quality papers published is shown in c BR and d BW
Page 9 of 11Wang et al. SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:903 
below the average quality of all submissions when eb ≥ 0.2. Figure 6a further indicates 
that effects of editorial biased behaviour will be worse with rational reviewers.
Figure  6b depicts the number of publications with the increasing of eb. Similar to 
Fig. 6a in both the BR condition (the black line) and BW condition (the red line), the 
number of publications increases accordingly. When eb ≥ 0.2, the number of all publica-
tions is more than 500, which means that the peer review system does not work at all.
The numbers of low-quality papers published under BR and BW scenarios are shown 
in Fig. 6c, d, respectively. Considering the BW condition in Fig. 6d, for example, when 
eb = 0, which means there is no biased editor, the number of low-quality papers pub-
lished is almost zero. While eb = 0.2, the number of low-quality papers published 
increases to around 250. With more biased editors, e.g. eb = 0.4, almost half of all pub-
lications are low-quality papers. The trend under BR condition is similar to that of BW 
condition, but the performance of peer review under BR condition is worse in compari-
son to that of BW condition. For example, when the eb = 0.2, the number of low-quality 
papers published is around 300 in BR scenario and 250 in BW scenario. In summary, our 
results show that the editorial biased behaviour hugely influences the performance of 
peer review systems.
Discussion and conclusion
This paper focused on documenting the potential influence of the interaction of social 
forces between editors and reviewers in the peer review system using an agent-based 
model. We extended previous study by considering the effect of editorial behaviours on 
peer review. We examined the effect of editorial behaviours on the average quality of all 
published papers, the number of published papers and the number of low-quality papers 
published.
Our proposed model confirmed that even a small fraction of rational reviewers may 
dramatically distort publication quality  (Thurner and Hanel 2011). We also found out 
that different editorial decision strategies affect the performance of peer review in terms 
of average quality of published papers, number of published papers and low-quality 
papers published. The situation slightly changed if editors choose reviewers with differ-
ent characteristics (the fair, the selfish and the harried) for specific manuscripts. Our 
results suggest that with more reviewers, the quality and fairness of peer review will be 
better. However, the cost of the review process also increases at the same time. Espe-
cially in recent years, more and more papers are being submitted, some reviewers even 
decline to review others’ manuscripts, which leads to a tragedy of commons (Hochberg 
et  al. 2009). Consequently, when making a decision on the number of reviewers, edi-
tors should be aware that though more reviewers would benefit peer review, the cost 
should also be taken into consideration (Bianchi 2015). Therefore, the conference/jour-
nal should nominate a suitable number of reviewers and make strategic decisions based 
on their specific requirements. For example, if you need a relatively high acceptance rate 
you may choose P-majority or P-any.
Furthermore, we investigated the effect of editorial biased behaviors. We found out 
that peer review outcomes are significantly sensitive to editorial biased behaviour. 
Even a small fraction (10 %) of biased editors may do harm to the performance of peer 
review (11.01  %), which is worse than that of biased reviewers (6.81  %). Specifically 
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when eb ≥ 0.2, the number of all publications is more than 500, which means that the 
peer review system is not better than random selection. Our results show that the 
biased behaviour of editors are even more serious than that of rational reviewers. This 
is because the impact of rational reviewers can be mitigated by increasing the size of 
reviewer sample (i.e., the number of reviewers per submission). Thus, we suggest that 
multiple editors could be recommended so that editorial bias can be reduced.
In reality, peer review is a complex social system. In this paper, we only focused on the 
quality selection aspect of peer review and the interactions between authors, reviewers 
and editors, which is lack of a sensitivity analysis for the parameters and simulations. 
In reality, peer review is a complex system and is not a one-step binary accept/reject 
precess. We ignored other potential benefits such as improvement of reviewing skills, 
improvement of manuscripts after reviewing and competition among conferences, etc. 
In addition to considering the above features of peer review systems in future, we also 
plan to simulate and analyze our model in more reality scenarios, e.g. with real peer 
review data.
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